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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E. L. ROMNEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
COVEY GARAGE, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, a corporation, 
Interpleaded Defendant and 
Respondent 
Case 
No. 6243 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, COVEY GARAGE 
Plaintiff's counsel have filed a well and cleverly 
prepared brief, which on first examination might appear 
to justify the desired conclusion. A more careful examina-
tion makes perfectly apparent that the real and deter-
minative factors have been begged. 
Respondent not only assumes that the evidence 
discloses negligence, but adds to that assumption, an 
additional assumption that the thief, Freeman, gained 
entrance as a result of such negligence, or in other words, 
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the 
theft and resulting accident. In other words, respondent 
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endeavors to recover on one assumption based upon an-
other assumption, or one conjecture predicated upon 
another conjecture. This court has recognized and ad-
hered to the rule that a judgment cannot be based upon 
conjectures upon conjectures or inferences upon infer-
ences. In Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 
4?' Pac. (2d) 1054, it was said: 
"The only things to rebut their testimony 
are the inferences heretofore discussed that coun-
sel would have us draw." 
Again the court says: 
"It is inference based on inference, in series 
and in reverse." 
Exactly the same argument is applicable to respondent's 
argument. He argues that although plaintiff's evidence 
does not definitely show negligence, yet by reading be-
tween the lines, an inference of negligence can be found. 
Certainly there is no more than such a possible infer-
ence. He next argues that while there is no evidence 
that Freeman gained entrance to the garage as a result 
of such inferred negligence, yet an inference may be 
drawn that he did so gain entrance. In other words, 
it is necessary in order to sustain the judgment to first 
infer negligence, and then on that inference, base an· 
other inference that the proximate cause or actual en-
trance resulted from the first inference of negligence. 
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It is a clear case of inference upon inference, with a 
total absence of positive evidence. 
Respondent completely ignores fundamental rules. 
He admits that there is no affirmative evidence of negli-
gence, and likewise admits that he has only shown pos-
sible or probable ways by which Freeman could have 
gained entrance. He says he has shown "a number of 
PROBABLE ways in which the thieves could have en-
tered." He then says, "On this, as well as other 
THEORIES of the facts, plaintiff made a prima facie 
case." In other words, his position is one merely of "prob· 
ability" or "theories" or "inferences." He entirely over-
looks the necessity that the "inferences" or "probabilities" 
must all lead in one direction and exclude other hy-
potheses. He overlooks the necessity for the evidence to 
do more than raise a conjecture or probability. This 
court in Tremelling v. Southern Pacific, 70 Utah 72, 257 
Pac. 1066, said: 
"The evidence must, however, do more than 
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability 
as to the cause of the injury, and no recovery 
can be had if the evidence leaves it to conjecture 
which of two causes resulted in the injury, where 
defendant was liable for only one of them." 
Certainly, as hereafter pointed out, the evidence 
does not exclude reasonable hypotheses under which no 
liability would attach. Not only is there a total failure 
in sueh respect, but rather does the evidence show affirm-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
b 
atively an exercise of reasonable and ordinary care b) 
the defendant, and a gaining of entrance by an experi· 
enced thief through some trick or device which ordinary 
care would not guard against. 
At page nine of his brief, respondent conclude~ 
that "if reasonable minds could differ as to whether 
defendant was negligent, the judgment of the trial court 
must be sustained." This statement would be true if, as 
we have pointed out, there was first, affirmative evi-
dence of negligence, and, second, evidence that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of Freeman's en-
trance and the resulting loss. Respondent again overlooks 
the basic rules of liability at page seventeen, in saying: 
"If this court decides * * ~~ that reasonable minds might 
differ as to whether or not defendant exercised reason-
able care for the protection of plaintiff's automobile, the 
judgment below must be affirmed." This argument, and 
in fact all arguments advanced in respondent's brief, 
consistently and cleverly assume as established the very 
facts, the absence of which sustain a successful defense 
against liability. The fundamental essentials of a cause 
of action, to-wit: evidence of negligence and evidence of 
proximate cause, are ignored. 
Counsel endeavor to show from the evidence how 
the burglars in this case may have found entrance tc 
the building. The most that can be said of his possibl~ 
theory is that they might have gained entrance by sud 
method, but it is equally as possible or probable tha1 
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7 
entrance was not gained by any means suggested, but 
rather while all the lights of the city were out, or by 
hiding in the back of an automobile taken into the 
garage. There is absolutely no evidence as to the actual 
means of entry. How then, could it be said defendant's 
negligence caused the loss? Even if it be assumed (with-
out proof} that defendant was negligent in not making 
certain the door to the wash rack was closed, how could 
it be said that such was the proximate cause of the loss, 
if Freeman entered when the lights of the city were 
out, and no one could see, or if he road in in the back of 
a car. 
A case based on negligence and proximate cause 
necessarily fails when all that is shown is a mere pos-
sibility. 
NO PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE 
The only doors to the garage other than the front 
entrance were the two doors, one on the north side of the 
garage, and the other on the south side between the, 
garage proper and another place of business. The latter 
was always kept locked with a padlock on the garage 
side, and a partition separated the places of business. 
No one could get in this door without first getting into 
the garage. (Tr. 2? -28, 45) As to the door on the north side, 
respondent's counsel asked the witness Remington, "Do 
you know whether or not that door was closed on the 
evening of April 30, 1938, between ten and eleven-thirty. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
"A. It was closed between ten and eleven, or after ten 
it was closed and locked." He did not recall that he had 
personally checked it that particular evening. (Tr. 27). 
As to the doors in the front of the garage, the 
opening at the extreme left, looking at plaintiff's Ex-
hibit "A," is a little sort of room that has a door in the 
back, but it is always kept locked and that is not used 
as an exit or entrance. (Tr. 68). The opening shown in the 
picture next to this room is the laundry or wash rack. 
The laundry closes at six o'clock. (Tr. 24). There are 
doors that close in front of the wash rack. (Tr. 25). The 
wash rack door is usually closed. (Tr. 32). He did. not 
know definitely whether or not the doors were closed 
between ten and eleven-thirty on the evening of April 
30, 1938. The other two entrances seen on the picture 
on either side of the gas pumps are used for driving 
cars in and out of the garage. The entire front 
of the garage is plainly visible from the office. THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE ANY DOORS WERE UNLOCKED OR THAT 
ANY EMPLOYEE FAILED IN HIS DUTY. 
Respondent's brief, page six, suggests "that the 
thieves were able to use the cars parked at the south 
end of the service platform as a screen to shield their 
entrance by means of the wash rack door." Simply an-
other possibility. Plaintiff's witness testified that the 
laundry closed at six o'clock p. m., and the wash rack 
is usually closed. It is pure speculation that the wash 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
rack door was not closed. It is pure speculation that the 
thieves entered through the wash rack. It is pure specu-
lation that even if they did enter through the wash 
rack, that the defendant was negligent, and certainly 
it is purely a guess that if defendant failed t(> exercise 
reasonable and ordinary care in any particulc.. r respect 
that the loss proximately resulted from such failure. The 
most that could be said for plaintiff's evidence is that 
Freeman might or possibly could have gained entrance 
through the wash rack. Negligence and proximate cause 
cannot be proved by merely showing what might have 
happened-mere possibilities. 
In our original brief, we cited general authority and 
many cases holding that the presumption arising in favor 
of plaintiff, based on proof of bailment and failure to 
return on demand, is completely overcome upon undis-
puted proof produced by either party that the bailed 
article was stolen or destroyed by fire. These cases are 
based upon the well-founded theory that the presump-
tion is merely a rule of orderly procedure requiring the 
bailee to go forward with the evidence in explanation 
of the loss, as distinguished from the burden of proof, 
which remains with plaintiff throughout. Respondent 
does not disagree with this rule and acknowledges his 
obligation to prove liability. This presumption is based 
purely on proof of the bailment and failure to return 
upon demand, and as neither the bailment, nor failure 
to return are in and of themselves actual evidence of 
neglip;ence, or any evidence as to whether or not the loss 
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actually occurred with or without the fault of the bailee, 
such presumption entirely disappears in the face of 
actual evidence. This represents the weight of authority 
and is the view taken by this court as last announced 
in Saltas v. Affleck, (Utah} 102 Pac. (2d) 493: 
"And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is 
that as soon as evidence is offered on the ques-
tion, the presumption ceases and does not longer 
exist. In Re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 468, 5 Pac. 
(2d} 230, State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2d) 
177, Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 Pac. (2d) 
1049, 109 A. L. R. 105." 
The fact that North Carolina goes a step further 
than the general rule and requires the bailee to rebut 
the presumption by more than proof of the bare fact 
of theft, makes all the more significant, the decision of 
Swain v. Twin City Motor Company, 178 S. E. 560 (Ap-
pellant's brief pp. 27-30, Respondent's brief pp. 19-21). 
In the instant case, there was the additional proof that 
the defendant's garage was operated in accordance with 
the same standards and customs of similar garages 
throughout the country, which method of operation was 
well-known to the plaintiff. 
Minnesota and Pennsylvania are alone in holding 
that the ultimate burden of proof is on the defendant 
or bailee to establish that it exercised due care. In 
Harding v. Shapiro (Minn.), 206 N. W. 168 (Respondent's 
brief p. 11}, it is said: 
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"The burden was upon defendant to prove 
that the loss of the property bailed with him was 
not the result of his negligence. * * * It was not for 
him merely to go forward with the evidence, but 
he had the burden of proving to the jury that the 
loss did not come from his negligence." 
And in Tr endt v. Sley System Garages, 188 Atl. 
624 (Respondent's brief p. 13), the Pennsylvania court 
says: 
"If a bailee fails to give a satisfactory ex-
planation for its disappearance, he has the burden 
of proving that the loss was not due to his neg-
ligence." 
These two states are obviously against the decided 
weight of authority. Respondent himself does not claim 
the burden of proof is on the defendant, but states at 
page seventeen: 
"Appellant takes the position that the ulti-
mate burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Since the 
plaintiff assumed and discharged the burden of 
proving negligence, this question is of no import-
ance upon appeal. The only question before this 
court is whether or not the judgment finds support 
in the testimony." 
We can agree with counsel In his statement that 
the question on this appeal should be decided upon 
"whether or not the judgment finds support in the testi-
mony," that is in the evidence. That being the case, 
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the fact that the ultimate burden of proof of establishing 
negligence is upon the plaintiff is of no importance on 
this appeal, except that if there is not sufficient actual 
evidence to sustain a finding of both specific negligence 
and proximate cause, plaintiff's case must fail; whereas, 
if the ultimate burden of proof were on the defendant 
to prove he was not negligent, then a finding in favor 
of plaintiff in a case of this kind might be perfectly 
proper, even though there was no evidence of negligence, 
just the same as a defendant, who being sued for dam-
ages arising out of an automobile accident would be 
entitled to a judgment in his favor if the plaintiff, who 
in that case had the ultimate burden of proof, failed 
to prove negligence and proximate cause. 
True, it is not the province of the appellate court 
to determine where the weight of the evidence is, but 
it is the province of such court to determine if there is 
any actual substantial evidence sufficient to sustain a 
finding of negligence and proximate cause. We maintain 
on this appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain 
a finding that defendant was negligent, and also insuffici-
ent to sustain a finding of proximate cause. On the con-
trary it is established that defendant exercised that 
reasonable care usually exercised by all garages. The 
evidence must do more than show that the defendant 
might have been negligent, or if negligent, that the loss 
might have been caused by such negligence. As stated 
in Fritz v. Electric Light Company, 18 Utah 493, 56 Pac. 
90 (Appellants brief pp. 36-37), "to entitle the plaintiffs 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
to recover, it was incumbent upon them to establish the 
negligence of defendant by some evidence, and that 
such negligence was either the cause of, or contributed to 
the accident. Negligence cannot be presumed, nor the 
question thereof left to conjecture." 
This is particularly true when a case is based on 
circumstantial evidence. ]ones on Evidence, Civ. Cases, 
4th Ed. Vol. 3. Sec. 899, p. 1681, says: 
"A theory cannot be said to be established by 
circumstantial evidence, either in a civil action or 
in a criminal prosecution unless the disclosed facts 
and circumstances shown are consistent therewith 
and inconsistent with any other rational theory." 
Cornwell v. O'Connor (Kan.), 5 Pac. (2d) 861: 
"The appellee relies upon circumstances to-
prove negligence. To accomplish this the facts 
and conditions must be of such significance and 
relation one to the other that a reasonable con-
clusion of negligence can be founded thereon. To 
establish a theory by circumstances the facts 
relied on must be of such a nature and so related 
one to the other that the only reasonable conclu-
sion to be drawn therefrom is the theory sought 
to be established." 
Simpson v. Hillman (Ore.), 9? Pac. (2d) 52?: 
"It is well established that the causal con-
nection between defendant's act or omission and 
the injury must not be left to surmise or con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
jecture. The evidence must be something more 
substantial than merely indicating a possibility 
that the alleged negligence of the defendant was 
the proximate cause of the injury. When the evi-
dence shows two or more equally probable causes 
of injury, for not all of which the defendant is 
responsible, no action for negligence can he main-
tained. In other words, negligence can not he 
based on conjecture or speculation." 
In Potter v. Dr. W. H. Groves L. D. S. Hospital 
(Utah), 103 Pac. (2d) 280, wherein this court held that 
plaintiff had failed to prove that the hospital was negli-
gent in not placing sideboards on a bed, it was said: 
"There is nothing to show that in not attach-
ing sideboards to Mrs. Potter's bed, appellant was 
not exercising due care prior to and at the time 
of her injury. Some negligent act or failure to 
act by the hospital or its servants must be alleged 
and proved. Plaintiffs (respondents) did not estab-
lish that a standard of due care required the 
hospital to place sideboards on the bed of patients 
in the condition of Mrs. Potter on Monday night. 
Therefore, its failure to place sideboards on Mrs. 
Potter's bed that night was not negligence." 
In that case, the accident might not have happened had 
they had sideboards on the bed. In the instant case in 
what respect it could be said defendant was negligent, 
much less appears than in the Potter case, because ab-
solutely nothing is shown which defendant should have 
been required to do in the exercise of ordinary care that 
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would have prevented the theft. Even an armed guard or 
a special watchman, which in the Swain case, supra, was 
not required, would not have prevented Freeman and his 
companion from slipping in while the city was in dark· 
ness or by hiding in the back of an automobile. As the 
California court said in Perera v. Panama-Pacific Inter-
national E.'-·position Co., 1 ?5 Pac. 454 (Appellant's brief 
pp. 31-32): 
"We find in the evidence no sufficient gauge 
by '"~hich it may fairly be concluded that the 
* * * protection so furnished was not reasonably 
adequate; that is, that it was less than a reason-
able man, in view of all the circumstances, would 
deem essential to * * '~: proper protection." 
RESPONDENT'S CASES 
To support his argument, counsel cites cases from 
Minnesota and Pennsylvania where, as we have pointed 
out, contrary to the great weight of authority, the ulti-
mate burden is on defendant to prove he was not negli-
gent. These cases have no application, because in those 
states, even if there was no evidence of negligence, a 
finding of negligence would be justified. "Since the 
plaintiff" in the instant case "assumed" and claimed 
to have "discharged the burden of proving negligence" 
(Respondent's brief p. 1 ?), these cases are of no import-
ance on this appeal. Many of the cases cited by respond-
ent had to do with garages closed and supposedly locked 
for the night, rather than a garage open for business. 
Others have to do with vacant lots, which were used for 
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parking cars. None of the cases, we submit, are in point, 
because they either come from a state where the ulti-
mate burden of proof rests on defendant, or are based 
solely on the so-called presumption rule, or are cases 
where specific negligence was found in the evidence. 
Rogers v. Murch, 149 N. E. 202 (Respondent's brief 
p. 9), had' to do with a garage left unattended for the 
night. There was no watchman, and plaintiff alleged and 
proved that the entrance to the building was effected 
through a window in the basement. 
In Harding v. Shapiro (Minn.), 206 N. W. 168 (Re-
spondent's brief p. 11), the means of entry was estab-
lished, and the garage had been closed, with no at-
tendants or watchmen on duty. Furthermore, the case 
coming from Minnesota, rests upon the rule there that 
defendant had the burden of proving he was not negli-
gent. 
The Baione v. Heavey decision (Pa.), 158 Atl. 181 
(Respondent's brief p. 12), likewise comes from a juris-
diction where the burden of proof is on defendant. In the 
opinion it is not stated what the evidence was, hut it 
does appear that there was an outside parking lot which 
was unfenced, and that the cars in leaving were not 
required to go out any particular exit and might cross 
the sidewalk at any place along two streets. 
Wendt v. Sley System Garages, 188 Atl. 624 (Re-
spondent's brief p. 13), likewise comes from Pennsyl-
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vania. There were only two attendants, when customarily 
at least four were provided. The quotation from 6 C. ]. 
1158, Section 160, quoted from the Wendt case, and also 
appearing at page 21 of respondent's brief, is incomplete. 
"'e quote further from this citation at page 1160: 
"But by the weight of authority the rule does 
not go so far as to require the bailee positively 
to acquit himself of negligence. The burden of 
proof of showing negligence is on the bailor 
and remains on him throughout the trial. The 
presumption arising from injury to the goods or 
failure to redeliver is sufficient to satisfy this bur-
den and make out a prima facie case against the 
bailee; but the bailee may overcome this pre-
sumption by showing that the loss occurred 
through some cause consistent with due care on 
his part, in which case he is entitled to the verdict 
unless the bailor affirmatively proves to the satis-
faction of the jury that the loss would not have 
occurred but for the negligence of the bailee. 
Thus if he proves that the loss was occasioned by 
burglary or theft, by fire, by the falling of the 
warehouse in which the goods were stored, or 
by any inevitable accident, the burden is again 
shifted to the bailor to prove defendant's neg-
ligence." 
In the instant case, there never was a presumption, 
because it affirmatively appeared without dispute and 
from plaintiff's complaint that the car had been stolen. 
Plaintiff based his action upon negligence and not upon 
any contract of bailment, introduced evidence and 
i.!.'islt1n(>d the obligation and claimed to have discharged 
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the burden of proving negligence. In face of the plead-
ings and evidence, no presumption existed. 
Byalos v. Matheson, 159 N. E. 242 (Respondent's 
brief p. 15), rests entirely on the presumption. Plaintiff's 
action in4hat case was not based on negligence, nor did 
\ 
the plaintiff undertake to prove negligence, and "no 
proof was offered by the appellant (defendant) that he 
was not guilty of negligence." 
In Medes v. Hornbach, 6 Fed. (2d) ?11 (Respond-
ent's brief p. 16), the automobile was taken out by one 
of the employees of defendant without the consent of 
the owner. 
We cannot see how the case of Travelers Fire In-
surance Co. v. Brock and Co., 85 Pac. (2d) 904 (Respond-
ent's brief p. 22), has any application, when in that state 
"the answer to the question on whom is the burden of 
proof as to defendant's negligence, depends on the plead-
ings." U Drive & Tour, Ltd., v. System Auto Parks, Ltd., 
(Cal. Super.) ?1 Pac. (2d) 354, 356. In the Travelers case, 
the action was "based on contract." ln the instant case, 
plaintiff not only based his complaint on negligence but 
at the trial "assumed * * * the burden of proving neg-
ligence." 
In Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, 293 Pac. 
821 (Respondent's brief p. 23), "the defendant's attendant 
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left its parking place without taking the slightest precau-
tion to protect plaintiff's car against theft." 
Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funk, 177 N. E. 364 (Respond-
ent's brief p. 25), is a case apparently based on the pre-
sumption, but the fact also appears that the bailor's 
wife asked that she be permitted to lock the car and 
take the keys with her. This request was refused. 
Hoel v. Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co., 175 N. W. 
300 (Respondent's brief p. 26), is another Minnesota case. 
Federal Insurance Co. v. Lindsley, 228 N. Y. S. 614, was 
an action apparently based on contract. 
In Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188 
Pac. 856, there was substantial evidence that "the man-
ager informed the porters that they had been careless, 
and promised plaintiff's husband that the matter would 
be fixed up if the grip could not be found." The finding 
of negligence was justified by the admission. 
In General Exchange Insurance Corporation v. Serv-
ice Parking Grounds, Inc., 235 N. W. 898 (Respondent's 
brief pp. 28-29) there was specific negligence: 
"Not only was the car taken without the 
surrender of the tickets, but it was further shown 
that there were no lights on the lot at night time; 
that the lot was enclosed by barriers, but it had 
two exits and entrances which were not guarded." 
The cases cited (Respondent's brief pp. 31-32), were 
cases where there were no attendants both day and night 
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and hoarders, lodgers, guests, and all were permitted free 
access to the garage. One of those cases, Employers Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Garage, 155 N. E. 533, had to do 
with a theft by one of defendant's employees. 
Respondent limits the question on this appeal to 
"whether or not the evidence supports the judgment." 
(Respondent's brief p. 31.) Negligence and proximate 
cause cannot, we submit, he sustained by the evidence. 
There can he no presumption in the instant case, be-
cause plaintiff did not base his complaint upon contract 
or upon the presumption, hut both undertook to allege 
and prove negligence and "assumed and" claimed to 
have "discharged the burden of proving negligence." 
The bailment and failure to return upon demand, the 
facts upon which any so-called presumption rests, are 
not in and of themselves any evidence of negligence, and 
when actual evidence was introduced, any possible pre-
sumption wholly disappeared. The actual evidence at 
most shows nothing hut possible ways of gaining en-
trance to the garage. The evidence is undisputed that the 
garage was being operated in accordance with the same 
standards and practices as other garages throughout the 
country, and this was known to plaintiff. There was no 
evidence that an established standard of due care was 
not maintained by the garage and its employees. The 
manner of entrance of the burglars is wholly unknown. 
It is just as probable they entered while the city was in 
darkness or by hiding in the hack of an automobile, or 
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by some other means. There is no fact shown which under 
the evidence can be said to be the basis of negligence on 
the part of the defendant. Nor is there any evidence by 
which it can possibly be determined that such fact, if 
its existance were supported by evidence, had even a 
remote connection with the real or actual cause of the 
theft. Even if it should be assumed that defendant was 
negligent in any manner which respondent suggests, 
it cannot be said that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the theft, if the thieves entered by some other 
means. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
court are insufficient to sustain the judgment for the 
same reasons. The court did not find the defendant negli-
gent in any particular. 
DEFENDANT'S DE~1URRER 
Jlangum v. Bullion, Etc., JIJining Co., 15 Utah 534, 50 
Pac. 834, and Eddington v. Cement Co., 42 Utah 274, 130 
Pac. 243 (Respondent's brief 34-35), had to do with a gen-
eral demurrer or an ob,jection to the complaint on appeal 
not made in the trial court. In the "A1 an gum case, it was 
said: 
"If the facts were not stated with certaintv 
and definiteness which good pleading requires, th~ 
appellant's remedy was by special demurrer or 
motion to make more definite and certain." 
In the instant case, defendant's general demurrer was 
based upon the fact that the cause of the loss affirma-
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tively appeared, namely, the theft. The purpose of the 
motion in Schaff v. Coyle (Okla.), 249 Pac. 94? (Respond-
ent's brief p. 36), is not disclosed in the opinion. Re-
spondent claims that all facts were within the knowledge 
and possession of the defendant, yet it appears that the 
employees of the garage themselves did not know how 
the thieves got in the garage. If respondent claims defend-
ant was negligent in parking the automobile south of 
the wash rack, certainly he could have alleged the same 
in his complaint. We submit that defendant's demurrer 
should have been sustained when actual negligence rather 
than a presumption is relied on. 
CLAIM OF AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSURANCE COMPANY 
It was our understanding (Tr.35) that respondent 
stipulated that the American Equitable Assurance Com-
pany paid to Mr. Romney, the plaintiff, under a collision 
coverage policy, the amount of his loss under the policy, 
subject to counsel's objection that it was immaterial; 
otherwise, defendant would have produced actual evi-
dence to that effect. True, the court did not pass on the 
materiality of the matter, hut, nevertheless, it was the 
duty of the court to make its findings in accordance with 
the evidence. In the Potomac case, the plaintiff was pro-
tected because the insurance company had paid the en-
tire loss and there had been an assignment, at least by 
subrogation of the entire loss. In the instant case, there 
was subrogation of a part of the loss, and defendant is 
entitled to he protected against the insurance company 
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as to the portion paid by it. To properly do this, the 
court should have divided the recovery, if any, between 
Mr. Romney and the insurance company, proportionate 
to the loss sustained by each. 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS SQUIRES 
In the cases cited by respondent, notice to the de-
fendant of a prior accident or event was held to be ma-
terial in putting the defendant on notice of some defective 
condition of the sidewalk or premises of the defendant, 
which after such notice could have been remedied. In 
Hurd v. U. P. Ry. Co., 8 Utah 241, 30 Pac. 982 (Respond-
ent's brief p 39) the sidewalk had been left Ill an un-
guarded and dangerous condition. 
In McCormick v. Great Western Power Co., 8 Pac. 
(2d) 145 (Respondent's brief p. 39), it is pointed out 
that electricity is a "dangerous instrumentality" and 
one who maintains it must exercise a high degree of care, 
and has a definite duty to keep the wires properly in-
sulated or placed beyond the point of danger. Prior ac-
cidents in question with the electric wires were notice 
that at a certain place, the wires were not properly 
maintained. 
In Sargent v. Union Fuel Co., 3?' Utah 392, 108 Pac. 
928 (Respondent's brief p. 41), there was a dangerous 
condition in defendant's mine, because of failure to 
timber or in some manner provide against the dangerous 
condition thereof. 
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In Osplind v. Pearce, 221 N. W. 6'79 (Respondent's 
brief p. 41), the evidence admitted was to show previous 
accidents caused by the same defect on a roller coaster, 
and in Manson v. Mays Department Stores Co., '71 S. W. 
(2) 1081 (Respondent's brief p. 41), the falling of plaster 
was notice to the defendant that the plaster on the ceil-
ing was loose and in a dangerous condition. 
The testimony of Squires, besides being objection-
able as hearsay, did not show any defect or condition 
which defendant might or should have remedied, or show 
any negligence of any employee which defendant might 
have corrected. Respondent would not seriously contend 
that if the defendant was being sued for the negligent 
operation of an automobile that the fact defendant 
had had a prior accident in the same automobile would 
he admissible or have any probative value in proving 
defendant was 11egligent in the second accident. The 
situation would he different, however, in the accident 
case, if the defendant had an accident because of a defect 
in the steering gear, hut continued to drive the same 
automobile without having such defect corrected, and 
thereafter had another accident caused by the same de-
fective gear. If a hank were robbed by a burglar getting 
through a basement window, the hinges of which were 
worn out, such would he notice to a hank to fix such de-
fective window. On the other hand, if the only fact 
known was the fact that the hank was robbed, there 
would he no proof that the hank was negligent if it 
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happened to be robbed again at a later date. As well 
stated in Perera v. Panama-Pacific International E.vposi-
tion Co., 175 Pac. 454, the "prior theft is of no practical 
importance in. this connection, in view of the want of evi-
dence as to the circumstances thereof." 
We submit, first, that the evidence of the prior theft 
in the instant case was inadmissible as being based on 
hearsay and because related to a wholly irrelevant and 
collateral matter, there being nothing shown as to the 
circumstances thereof, and nothing showing a defect or 
condition that defendant might or should have remedied, 
and, second, that at any rate, the matter was of no 
practical importance in the case, except to prejudice the 
trial court. 
DAMAGES 
Respondent has no answer to appellant's assign-
ment of error No. 12 (Ab. 56). The court erred in per-
mitting plaintiff to amend his complaint to increase the 
amount of damages claimed, in view of the specific stipu-
lation limiting the damages if plaintiff should recover, 
to $715.00 in addition to the usual taxable costs. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment In this 
case should be reversed. 
STEW ART, STEW ART & PARKINSON 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant, Covey Garage 
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